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Risk of Choking to Death on One’s Own 
Blood Is Not Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
Calla M. Mears* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Missouri began executing inmates in 1810 by hanging Peter Johnson, a 
man accused of murder.1  Since Johnson’s execution, Missouri executed 374 
inmates between 1810 and 2019.2  Hanging was the most common method of 
execution in Missouri until 1936.3  Lethal gas was first used in Missouri in 
1937 and became the most common execution method until 1987, when lethal 
injection took over as the predominant method.4   
Russell Bucklew is hardly the first person to challenge Missouri’s lethal 
injection protocol – and for good reason.5  Lethal injection has resulted in a 
much greater proportion of botched executions than any other execution 
method, at 7.12%, with 75 out of 1054 executions by lethal injection going 
wrong.6  Given the high rate of botched executions, challenged lethal injection 
 
*  B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2021; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021.  I would like to 
thank Dean Litton for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well 
as the Missouri Law Review for its assistance in the editorial process. 
 1. Missouri, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-
and-federal-info/state-by-state/missouri [perma.cc/ZR97-B67D]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2007); Clemons v. 
Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 6. Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/botched-executions [perma.cc/264G-CT9T] 
(“Botched executions occur when there is a breakdown in, or departure from, the 
‘protocol’ for a particular method of execution . . . Botched executions are ‘those 
involving unanticipated problems or delays that caused, at least arguably, unnecessary 
agony for the prisoner or that reflect gross incompetence of the executioner.”).  The 
botched execution rates are as follows for the other methods used: 3.12% of hangings, 
1
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protocols deserve less deference than the United States Supreme Court has 
generally given them.  
Bucklew was convicted and sentenced to death in 1997 for a crime spree 
of murder, burglary, and kidnapping.7  On June 25, 2019, a final warrant of 
execution was ordered for Bucklew.8  The process leading to the final 
execution order was long, arduous, and filled with questionable judicial 
reasoning.  Part II of this Note first walks through the factual underpinnings 
of Bucklew’s case and the various steps of litigation that led to the instant 
decision.  It explores Bucklew’s direct appeal, the inmate class action lawsuit 
he joined, his habeas corpus claim, the various Eighth Circuit decisions, and 
the Supreme Court decision.  Next, Part III outlines the background of death 
penalty jurisprudence, the history of execution methods in the United States, 
and recent challenges to lethal injection.  Part IV then details the Supreme 
Court’s holding and reasoning, the two concurring opinions, and the two 
dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V critiques the majority’s holding and 
reasoning and addresses practical implications and theoretical concerns that 
result from the majority’s decision. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On March 21, 1996, Russell Bucklew followed his ex-girlfriend, 
Stephanie Ray, to a home in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri that she shared 
with her boyfriend, Michael Sanders.9  Bucklew waited outside Ray’s home 
for several hours, armed with duct tape, handcuffs, and pistols stolen from his 
brother.10  Later that evening, Bucklew entered the home and shot Sanders to 
death.11  Bucklew went on to strike Ray with a pistol, handcuff her, and throw 
her in his vehicle before driving away.12  Bucklew raped Ray in his vehicle 
and drove until he was apprehended by law enforcement following a 
shootout.13 
In Boone County, Missouri, Bucklew was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, burglary in the first degree, and kidnapping.14  The jury found 
 
1.92% of electrocutions, 5.4% of executions by lethal gas, and 0% of executions by 
firing squad.  The botched execution rate for all methods is 3.15%.  Id. 
 7. Jack Suntrup, Execution Date Set for Missouri Death Row Inmate Convicted 




 8. Id.  He was ordered to be executed three times before: in 1998, on April 9, 
2014, and on March 20, 2018. Id.  
 9. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  Sanders’s children were also present at the time of the incident but were 
not physically harmed.  Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 86–87. 
 14. Id. at 86. 
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two aggravating circumstances: that Bucklew committed the crimes of both 
burglary and kidnapping during the commission of murder.15  The jury 
recommended the death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Bucklew to 
death.16  Bucklew challenged his conviction and death sentence on direct 
appeal in 1998.17  The Missouri Supreme Court denied all of Bucklew’s 
claims18 and affirmed the judgment.19 
A.  Inmate Class Action Lawsuit  
In 2012, Bucklew was one of twenty-one Missouri death row inmates to 
challenge the execution protocol issued by the Missouri Department of 
Corrections (“MDOC”).20  The action was originally brought as a petition for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of Cole 
County, Missouri before it was removed to federal court in August 2012.21  
The new protocol “mandate[d] execution via injection of 2 g[rams] of the 
anesthetic propofol and 10 [cubic centimeters] of the pain-suppressant 
lidocaine.”22  The plaintiffs argued that the protocol violated the ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Missouri 
Constitution by creating a substantial and foreseeable risk of severe pain 
during executions.23  After several amendments to the original complaint, the 
plaintiffs’ claims were ultimately dismissed on May 2, 2014 for failing to state 
any claims upon which relief could be granted.24  The litigation concluded on 
May 16, when the plaintiffs refused to correctly re-plead their Eighth 
Amendment claim, citing a disagreement with the court’s holding that the 
plaintiffs would be required to propose an alternative execution method to 
survive the pleading stage.25  After this unsuccessful class action litigation, 
Bucklew resorted to challenging his own execution under habeas corpus 
law.26 
 
 15. Id. at 94. 
 16. Id. at 86–87. 
 17. See id. 
 18. None of the claims made by Bucklew on direct appeal are relevant to the 
instant decision. 
 19. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d at 98. 
 20. See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155 (W.D. 
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012). 
 21. Id. at *1. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *3 
(W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014), rev’d, 565 F. App’x 562 (8th Cir. 2014), rev’d and 
remanded, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 25. Id.  
 26. See Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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B.  Habeas Corpus Challenge 
On April 9, 2014, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered Bucklew’s 
execution for May 21.27  Bucklew argued in a motion that a stay of execution 
was necessary to determine the risks involved as applied28 to executing him 
by lethal injection with the drug pentobarbital.29  To prevail on this motion, 
Bucklew was required to prove that there was a substantial likelihood the use 
of pentobarbital would cause severe harm.30  Further, he needed to present a 
feasible and readily implemented alternative method of execution.31  Bucklew  
suffered a rare condition called cavernous hemangioma since infancy.32  
Cavernous hemangioma is a condition where “vascular lesions consisting of 
abnormally dilated blood vessels” are formed.33  The blood vessels form 
“cavern-like” pockets were blood pools and then leaks due to defects in the 
walls of the vessels.34  The lesions – varied in size – can cause headaches, 
hemorrhages, stroke symptoms, and seizures, depending on the size and 
location of the lesion.35  Such symptoms subside and reappear over time 
because the pockets change in size as they leak and reabsorb blood.36 
Cavernous hemangioma of the uvula is exceedingly rare: as of 2015, 
only four cases have been reported in English literature.37  Bucklew’s 
cavernous hemangioma primarily involved his face, including his pharynx.38  
During an examination by a physician on May 12, 2014, Bucklew had a “very 
large vascular mass” that obstructed his airway.  According to the examining 
physician, his “airway [was] severely compromised or obstructed due to the 
 
 27. Order of Execution, State v. Bucklew, No. SC80052 (Mo. Apr. 9, 2014). 
 28. As-applied challenges are those that argue a law or policy is constitutional on 
its face, but unconstitutional as applied in a particular situation. Challenge, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 29. Motion for Stay of Execution at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-
W-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014).  Missouri adopted the use of 
pentobarbital for executions in 2013.  MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, Preparation and 
Administration of Chemicals for Lethal Injection (2013), 
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/MissouriProtoc
ol10.18.2013.pdf [perma.cc/3Z85-VNGE]. 
 30. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Motion for Stay of Execution at 2, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-
W-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (Mo. May 19, 2014).   
 33. Rule 26(a)(2) Supplemental Expert Report of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 5, 
Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 
19, 2014). 
 34. Id. at 5–6. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Minhua Wang et al., Cavernous Hemangioma of the Uvula: Report a Rare 
Case with Literature Review, 8 N. AM. J. OF MED. AND SCI. 56 (2015). 
 38. Declaration of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 3, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-
CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014). 
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hemangiomas.”39  In the motion, Bucklew argued his disorder presented 
unique risks in an execution by lethal injection.40  Specifically, Bucklew 
contended that Missouri’s lethal injection method would cause him to suffer 
severe pain from hemorrhaging or abnormal circulation, leading to a 
prolonged execution or that his condition would prevent the drug from 
circulating properly.41  Bucklew further claimed that MDOC knew about the 
risks and failed to assess them with a proper medical examination.42 
In response, the State argued Bucklew failed to show Missouri’s use of 
pentobarbital in executions was “sure or very likely to cause serious illness 
and needless suffering” or that it would “give rise to sufficiently imminent 
dangers.”43  Further, the State claimed Bucklew did not sufficiently “present 
a specific, feasible, more humane method of execution.”44  The district court 
denied Bucklew’s Motion for Stay of Execution, concluding that his claims 
failed as a matter of law.45  In particular, the court held that Bucklew was not 
specific enough in his claims and therefore failed to show how the potential 
adverse consequences would rise to the level of unconstitutional pain.46  The 
court also found that Bucklew did not suggest any feasible alternative methods 
of execution.47 
C.  Eighth Circuit Decisions 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision and granted Bucklew’s motion.48  The 
Eighth Circuit determined that Bucklew’s medical evidence, which the State 
did not rebut, showed a likelihood of severe pain.49  Further, the court held 
Bucklew was not required under current precedent to procure an alternative 
method of execution, because his case involved a “specific, medically-based, 
as-applied, individual challenge” to his execution method.50  Judge Loken 
 
 39. Supplemental Affidavit of Joel B. Zivot, M.D. at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi, 
No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014). 
 40. Motion for Stay of Execution at 1, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-
W-BP, 2014 WL 12816298 (W.D. Mo.. May 19, 2014).   
 41. Id. at 4.  
 42. Id. at 2–5. 
 43. Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff Russell Bucklew’s Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and Bucklew’s Motion for 
Stay of Execution at 6, Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 
2736014 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014). 
 44. Id. at 7.  
 45. Bucklew v. Lombardi, No. 14-8000-CV-W-BP, 2014 WL 2736014, at *10 
(W.D. Mo. May 19, 2014). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *5.  
 48. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 F. App’x 562, 564 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
5
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dissented and agreed with the court below that Bucklew did not present 
specific enough evidence of a risk of unconstitutional pain.51 
The next day, May 21, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted 
Bucklew a stay of execution pending disposition of his appeal.52  On rehearing 
en banc, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court was premature in 
dismissing Bucklew’s complaint sua sponte, because it was not obvious he 
could not prevail.53  The court directed the State to timely respond to 
Bucklew’s complaint or any amended complaint.54  Additionally, the court 
ordered Bucklew to timely present a “feasible, readily implemented 
alternative procedure that will significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe 
pain and that the State refuses to adopt.”55  On remand, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the State, again holding that Bucklew 
did not present sufficient evidence to establish his claim.56  Bucklew again 
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.57  
Bucklew’s execution was scheduled for March 20, 2018.58 
D.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
The United States Supreme Court granted Bucklew’s Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari and affirmed the courts below.59  Bucklew argued the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision should be reversed because (1) it erroneously assumed the 
execution would go as intended; (2) it incorrectly applied the “known-and-
available-alternatives requirement,” which was developed for facial 
challenges, to Bucklew’s as-applied challenge; and (3) lethal gas would 
substantially reduce Bucklew’s risk of suffering.60  The State argued in 
response that (1) Bucklew failed to raise a “known and available alternative 
method” of execution and failed to show that he was “sure or very likely” to 
undergo extreme pain from lethal injection; (2) the alternative method of 
execution element applies to as-applied challenges; and (3) Bucklew’s claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations because he knew of the factual basis 
for his claim in 2008 but did not bring this action until twelve days before his 
scheduled execution.61 
The Supreme Court disagreed with Bucklew and held that an available 
alternative method must be presented in all challenges, whether facial or as 
 
 51. Id. at 572–73. 
 52. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 572 U.S. 1131 (2014). 
 53. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1127 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 54. Id. at 1128.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Bucklew v. Precythe, 883 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 57. Id. at 1090. 
 58. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 
(2019). 
 59. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019). 
 60. Brief for Petitioner at 23–24, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
 61. Brief of Respondents at 20–24, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
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applied.62  The proposed alternative method must be not only feasible but also 
“readily implemented.”63  The Court determined Bucklew’s suggested method 
of execution – nitrogen hypoxia – did not adequately show an available 
alternative because it had never been used by the State.64  The State of 
Missouri was entitled to summary judgment on Bucklew’s Eighth 
Amendment claim because his proposed alternative method of execution was 
neither feasible nor readily implemented, and even if Bucklew met both of 
those requirements, he did not present enough evidence to show his method 
would substantially reduce his risk of pain.65 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Capital punishment has existed since at least the Eighteenth Century 
B.C.E.66  Death penalty jurisprudence has a lengthy history that goes back 
further than the founding of the United States.67  This Section first examines 
the history of capital punishment in the United States and the application of 
the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment.  Next, it details the history of 
modern lethal injection challenges following the reinstation of capital 
punishment in 1976.  This Section then turns to modern challenges that 
fundamentally altered the legal landscape for lethal injection challenges, first 
outlining those brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (“Section 1983”).  
Finally, it looks at the effects of two landmark cases, Baze v. Rees and Glossip 
v. Gross, on death penalty jurisprudence. 
A.  A History of Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment 
Capital punishment in the United States has steadily evolved from 
barbaric roots that allowed a variety of execution methods to the modern 
conception of a clinical procedure primarily involving lethal injection.68  In 
the early days of the country’s existence, judges had discretion to choose 
execution methods.69  The possible methods were beheading, drowning, 
 
 62. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1126. 
 63. Id. at 1129.  A proposed method is “readily implemented” when it is 
sufficiently detailed to allow a finding that it could be carried out reasonably quickly 
and relatively easily by the State. Id.  
 64. Id. at 1129–30. 
 65. Id. at 1133. 
 66. The first historical mention of capital punishment was in the Code of King 
Hammurabi of Babylon.  History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/early-
history-of-the-death-penalty [perma.cc/G6PT-U4ZT]. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Chris Fisher, Evolution of Execution, CBA Rec. 40, 41 (Sept. 2007). 
 69. Robert J. Sech, Note, Hang ‘Em High: A Proposal for Thoroughly Evaluating 
the Constitutionality of Execution Methods, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 390 (1995). 
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hanging, burning, breaking at the wheel, and drawing and quartering.70  Most 
executions were carried out by hanging, which remained the most common 
method of execution throughout the eighteenth century and the first half of 
the nineteenth century.71  Electrocution was introduced in New York as a 
supposedly more humane execution method following anti-hanging sentiment 
that developed before and during the Civil War.72  By the end of the 1920s, 
more than half of all states that imposed capital punishment used 
electrocution.73  Lethal gas was introduced in Nevada in 1931 and quickly 
expanded to other states as another common execution method.74 
Cruel and unusual punishment, which was originally interpreted by 
courts to mean inhumane and barbarous punishment, is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.75  Early courts did not 
provide a comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment, but 
additional standards were developed by the Supreme Court.76  A state’s 
method of execution must not involve torture or lingering death, as any 
punishment involving torture violates the Eighth Amendment.77  The 
punishment must comply with modern civilized standards to be consistent 
with human dignity.78  States are prohibited from intentionally inflicting 
unnecessary pain.79 
Courts have long been inconsistent in analyses used to determine 
whether a certain punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather than 
following uniform standards or rules, courts are largely left to determine 
whether the punishment “comports with contemporary standards of 
decency.”80  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the State has 
a duty under the Eighth Amendment to assume responsibility for the well-
being and safety of the individuals incarcerated in its prisons.81  The Eighth 
Amendment now bars more than just physically barbarous punishments.82  
The State has an obligation to provide medical care for its prisoners when 
denial of such care could result in pain and suffering that serves no 
 
 70. Id. at 390–91 n.51. 
 71. Id. at 391. 
 72. Id. at 392.  A constitutional challenge to New York’s electrocution method 
was made in 1890, but it was swiftly denied by the United States Supreme Court.  See 
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
 73. Sech, supra note 69, at 393. 
 74. Id. at 393–94. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see e.g., McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 
874, 875 (Mass. 1899). 
 76. See e.g., Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436. 
 77. Id. at 447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). 
 78. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 79. Louisiana ex rel. Frances v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
 80. See e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 81. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 
(1989). 
 82. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
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penological purpose because the infliction of such suffering does not comport 
with modern standards of decency.83  The Supreme Court held in Estelle v. 
Gamble that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners 
establishes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment and sufficiently states a cause of action under Section 
1983,84 which grants a cause of action to any citizen subjected to the 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws” under the laws or customs of any state.85  Helling v. 
McKinney established that prisoners can bring Eighth Amendment claims 
under Section 1983 for possible risk of future harm to health caused by 
deliberate indifference, even if there is no current risk of harm.86 
B.  Modern Challenges to Lethal Injection 
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court effectively deemed all death 
penalty statutes unconstitutional because of arbitrary application and lack of 
guidance for juries.87  After being prohibited briefly, capital punishment was 
reestablished by the Supreme Court in 1976.88  Following the reinstatement, 
Oklahoma was the first state to adopt lethal injection on May 11, 1977; Texas 
adopted it the next day, and New Mexico and Idaho adopted it soon after.89  
Thirty-seven states adopted lethal injection between 1977 and 2002, and 
Texas was the first to use it for an execution in 1982.90  Today, all twenty-
nine death penalty states use lethal injection as their primary method of 
execution, even if it offers other methods.91  Most modern lethal injection 
challenges have focused on either the drugs used or the injection procedure.92 
The writ of habeas corpus was first established in the Magna Carta in 
1215 as a way for prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention.93  In 
 
 83. Id. at 102–03. 
 84. Id. at 104–05. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 86. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
 87. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 88. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (holding that Georgia’s revised 
capital punishment statute was sufficiently structured to prevent its arbitrary 
application, effectively providing a way for the other states to reinstate capital 
punishment). 
 89. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has 
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 78 (2007). 
 90. Id. at 78–79. 
 91. Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution [perma.cc/YHL4-
2LA2].  Other methods include electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, and firing squad. 
 92. Jerry Merrill, Comment, The Past, Present, & Future of Lethal Injection: 
Baze v. Rees’ Effect on the Death Penalty, 77 UMKC L. REV. 161, 171 (2008). 
 93. Benjamin R. Orye III, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When A Judgment of Conviction 
9
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the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted federal courts the power 
to grant the writ to federal prisoners.94  While it could initially only be used to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing body, the Supreme Court 
expanded it in 1942 to include challenges based on other constitutional 
grounds.95  Since 1942, habeas corpus relief has been available to an inmate 
when, inter alia, his or her conviction or sentence was obtained in violation 
of a federal constitutional right.96  In the past, those on death row often used 
habeas corpus to challenge their sentences. 
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEPDA”) in 1996 to further regulate federal habeas corpus actions.97  
AEPDA imposed a variety of restrictions on habeas corpus petitions and 
effectively limited such petitions so that they could only be brought shortly 
after the exhaustion of all direct appeals.98  AEDPA prohibited all “second or 
successive habeas corpus application[s]” presented in a prior petition and 
banned those not previously presented with a few narrow exceptions.99  A 
petitioner can bring a claim in a successive application only if he or she can 
show that it “relies on a new rule of constitutional law . . . that was previously 
unavailable” or if new evidence that could not have previously been found is 
discovered and no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner 
guilty given the new evidence.100  All other habeas corpus claims must be filed 
within one year of final judgment for claims on direct appeal.101 
1.  Section 1983 Challenges 
AEDPA made lethal injection challenges nearly impossible because 
execution dates are not always set before the one-year limit for a habeas 
corpus action expires.102  In 2004, however, the Supreme Court allowed 
prisoners to challenge execution protocols under Section 1983.103  While a 
habeas corpus petition would entirely invalidate a conviction or sentence, a 
Section 1983 claim would enjoin the State from any action that would 
 
Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441, 
444 (2002). 
 94. Id. at 446.  The writ’s application was expanded to state prisoners in 1867. 
Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2018).  Habeas corpus actions are petitions filed by inmates 
challenging the legality of the petitioner’s detention or imprisonment.  Habeas 
Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 98. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169.  
 99. § 2244(b)(1)–(2). 
 100. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)(ii). 
 101. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 
 102. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169. 
 103. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644–46 (2004). 
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constitute a civil rights violation.104  In Nelson v. Campbell, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that an execution method could be challenged without 
invalidating the execution itself.105  In Nelson, for example, the challenged 
method was a “cut-down” procedure that would be used to access the 
petitioner’s veins.106  The Court ultimately remanded the case to the district 
court to determine whether the “cut-down” procedure was necessary to 
administer the lethal injection.107  If the procedure was found unnecessary, the 
State would be required to provide an alternative method of vein access but 
the execution would still be carried out via lethal injection.108 
In 2006, the Supreme Court extended Nelson to allow Section 1983 
claims to challenge the entire lethal injection procedure rather than just 
components of the procedure.109  In Hill v. McDonough, petitioner Hill 
brought a Section 1983 claim challenging the common three-drug sequence 
Florida planned on using to execute him.110  The courts below construed Hill’s 
claim as a habeas corpus petition and denied it for failing to comply with the 
stringent requirements imposed by AEDPA.111  The Supreme Court held that 
Nelson was controlling because Hill’s claim did not challenge the lethal 
injection sentence generally but rather sought to prevent the State from 
executing him with a particular lethal injection method.112  The Court also 
found it important that Florida law did not require the use of the planned 
execution method, so the State could conceivably use an alternative lethal 
injection procedure.113  When taken together, Nelson and Hill opened the 
floodgates for lethal injection challenges under Section 1983.114 
 
 104. Merrill, supra note 92, at 169. 
 105. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644.  
 106. Id. at 642.  The “cut-down” procedure at issue in Nelson consisted of “prison 
personnel . . . mak[ing] a 2-inch incision in petitioner’s arm or leg; the procedure 
would take place one hour before the schedule execution; and only local anesthesia 
would be used” because he had compromised veins. Id. at 641.  
 107. Id. at 646.  
 108. Id. at 644.  
 109. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 580 (2006). 
 110. Id. at 576.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 580.  
 113. Id. at 573–74. 
 114. See e.g., Jackson v. Taylor, No. Civ. 06-300-SLR, 2006 WL 1237044 at *1 
(D. Del. May 9, 2006) (“[I]t was agreed that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill will 
have a dispositive effect on plaintiff’s claims and that staying this litigation is the most 
prudent course of action.”); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979–80, 983–84 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (ordering the State to address deficiencies in its execution procedure, 
such as unreliable and inconsistent screening of the execution team; a lack of 
supervision, oversight, and training; poor record-keeping; improper mixing and 
preparation of one of the drugs to be administered; and poor working conditions for  
the execution team); Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 903 (M.D. Tenn. 2007), 
vacated, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that Tennessee’s three-drug protocol 
did have unnecessary and inherent risks of severe pain, and the State was deliberately 
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2.  The Baze-Glossip Test 
In 2008, a group of inmates in Kentucky unsuccessfully challenged the 
lethal injection execution method in Baze v. Rees.115  The inmates claimed 
that the risk the lethal injection procedure will not be properly administered 
violated the Eighth Amendment.116  The Court held the possibility that an 
execution method may result in pain does not establish an “objectively 
intolerable risk of harm” that amounts to cruel and unusual harm.117  The 
Court further concluded that proposing a “slightly or marginally safer 
alternative” is not sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to challenge a 
state’s method of execution.118  Rather, there must be a substantial risk of 
serious pain and “the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily 
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe 
pain.”119   
In 2015, the Supreme Court added to the Baze decision in Glossip v. 
Gross.  There, a group of Oklahoma inmates on death row challenged the use 
of midazolam in Oklahoma’s execution protocol as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment for its risk of failing to desensitize the inmates from pain.120  The 
Supreme Court found Baze to be controlling and set out two requirements to 
successfully enjoin a state’s execution method.121  First, a petitioner must 
establish that he or she can show a likelihood that the state’s lethal injection 
protocol creates a proven risk of severe pain.122  Second, a petitioner must 
show that the alleged risk is substantial compared to available known 
alternatives.123  The Court ultimately determined that the inmates in Glossip 
failed to sufficiently show that midazolam created a substantial risk of harm 
as compared to any known and available alternative.124  The effects of Baze 
and Glossip on death penalty jurisprudence were great.  When considered 
 
indifferent by rejecting a proposed one-drug protocol); Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 
1072, 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an “unnecessary risk of causing wanton 
infliction of pain” is a sufficient basis to challenge an execution protocol, but 
determining that the State’s practice of not requiring anesthesiologist involvement was 
not a violation of the Eighth Amendment).  Missouri’s execution protocol was  
challenged again in 2009 by eight inmates who argued that the State’s previously 
employing unqualified and incompetent execution team members violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  The Eighth Circuit found that to be an insufficient basis for an Eighth 
Amendment execution protocol challenge. See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119 
(8th Cir. 2009). 
 115. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
 116. Id. at 49.  
 117. Id. at 50.  
 118. Id. at 51.  
 119. Id. at 52.  
 120. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015). 
 121. Id. at 2737. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 2737–38. 
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together, the two cases formed a test for challenges to execution methods: the 
petitioner must show that there is a substantial likelihood the challenged 
method creates a risk of severe pain and that there is a feasible and readily 
available alternative method.  The Supreme Court used the Baze-Glossip test 
to analyze Bucklew’s claim.125 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court rejected Bucklew’s as-applied 
challenge for a variety of reasons.  This Section reviews the majority’s holding 
and reasoning.  Next, it briefly looks at the concurring opinions, before finally 
examining the dissenting opinions. 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court upheld Bucklew’s execution method in a five-to-
four decision with two concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions.126  
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Gorsuch, began by addressing 
Bucklew’s argument that the Baze-Glossip test should only apply to facial 
challenges and not to as-applied challenges such as his.127  The Court first 
noted that the Constitution permits – but does not require – states to authorize 
capital punishment, and the Supreme Court may only prohibit execution 
methods that are cruel and unusual.128  The majority went on to detail the 
history of the Eighth Amendment and how it has been applied to capital 
punishment.129  The Court paid particular attention to the historical meaning 
of “cruel and unusual” punishment and noted how its original intention was 
to prevent execution methods akin to torture.130  The majority also mentioned 
how the predominant execution method at the time of the Eighth 
Amendment’s adoption was hanging, which was considered more humane 
than other punishments yet “was no guarantee of a quick and painless 
death.”131  The Court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment only bans 
punishment that superimposes additional elements of terror or pain and 
emphasized that no challenged execution method has ever been found by the 
Court to be cruel and unusual.132 
Bucklew argued that the Baze-Glossip test only applied to facial 
challenges because “there is no risk that an as-applied claim will function as 
a back-door attack on the constitutionality of the death penalty.”133  The Court 
 
 125. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1128 (2019). 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 1122.  
 128. Id. at 1122–23.  
 129. Id. at 1123–24. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 1124.  
 132. Id.; Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015). 
 133. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
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denied Bucklew’s argument because Glossip expressly stated that identifying 
an available alternative is required for all Eighth Amendment execution 
method challenges.134  The majority went on to simplify the difference 
between facial and as-applied challenges as being a mere difference in breadth 
of people affected and remedies available.135  The majority reasoned that to 
determine whether a method of execution is unconstitutionally painful 
necessarily requires a comparison to an alternative method.136  The Court 
denied Bucklew’s argument on a second ground.  Specifically, the majority 
found that his reasoning was inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment, which the Court stated was to prevent the infliction of 
more pain than is necessary to carry out an execution.137  The majority also 
took issue with the line-drawing problem present in Bucklew’s suggestion that 
challenges like his would not lead to a categorical ban on certain punishments 
and questioned whether an inmate with a common – but not universal – 
disorder challenging an execution method would be considered facial or as-
applied.138  Finally, the Court downplayed the burden Bucklew must carry to 
present an alternative execution method because he was not limited only to 
methods currently authorized by Missouri.139  The majority maintained, 
however, that the State could present a legitimate reason why it would not 
decline the proposed alternative.140 
After finding that Baze and Glossip apply to all lethal injection 
challenges, the Court next turned to whether Bucklew’s claim would satisfy 
the Baze-Glossip test.141  The alternative method Bucklew proposed – 
nitrogen hypoxia – was rejected by the Court for two reasons.142  First, 
Bucklew was not specific enough in describing the alternative method for it 
to be readily implemented.143  Second, the State had a legitimate reason for 
declining to switch from its current method because the proposed alternative 
had never been carried out and Missouri would be the first.144  The Court also 
determined that Bucklew did not show his alternative method would 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain because the risks he 
alleged were too speculative and not supported by evidence.145  The Court 
 
 134. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1126. 
 135. Id. at 1127–28.  
 136. Id. at 1126.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1128.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  The bar for presenting a reason not to adopt the proposed alternative 
method is low. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) (a state has a legitimate 
interest in using a method that “preserv[es] the dignity of the procedure”). 
 141. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1129.  Because summary judgment was granted below, 
the decision hinged on whether Bucklew presented a genuine issue of material fact. 
 142. Id. at 1129–30. 
 143. Id. at 1129.  
 144. Id. at 1129–30. 
 145. Id. at 1130–33. 
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finally concluded that Bucklew managed to extend his case longer than 
necessary to the detriment of the people of Missouri and Bucklew’s victims.146 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment 
was only designed to prevent the intentional infliction of pain, and therefore, 
Bucklew’s claim failed because the pain alleged would not be inflicted 
intentionally.147  In a separate concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with 
the majority but emphasized that the proposed alternative method of execution 
does not have to be authorized under current state law.148 
B.  Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent and joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded Bucklew’s proposed execution was a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.149  The dissent determined that summary 
judgment should not have been granted to the State because Bucklew provided 
expert testimony, which established a genuine issue of material fact that 
should have gone to trial.150  Justice Breyer disagreed with the application of 
Glossip to this case, determining that its alternative method requirement 
should not apply to as-applied challenges such as Bucklew’s.151  The dissent 
also disagreed with the majority’s view that nitrogen hypoxia would be 
difficult to implement, citing reports in evidence saying it would be “simple 
to administer.”152  The dissent further argued that Glossip did not require 
evidence on “essential questions,” such as when and how the nitrogen should 
be administered.153  Finally, the dissent agreed with the majority that the time 
between conviction and execution was “excessive” but disagreed with the 
majority’s solution of “curtailing constitutional guarantees afforded to 
prisoners like Bucklew who have been sentenced to death.”154 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate dissenting opinion to emphasize this 
point, stating “[t]here are higher values than ensuring that executions run on 
time.  If a death sentence or the manner in which it is carried out violates the 
Constitution, that stain can never come out.  Our jurisprudence must remain 
one of vigilance and care, not one of dismissiveness.”155 
 
 146. Id. at 1134.  
 147. Id. at 1135 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. at 1135–36 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 1136 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (first, Justice Breyer argued that Bucklew 
established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he would face extreme 
suffering; second, he considered whether a prisoner with a rare medical condition must 
identify an alternative method; finally, he addressed the issue of minimizing delays in 
executing death row offenders). 
 150. Id. at 1137–39. 
 151. Id. at 1140. 
 152. Id. at 1142–43.  
 153. Id. at 1143.  
 154. Id. at 1144.  
 155. Id. at 1148 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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V.  COMMENT 
There are several problems with the outcome of this case that raise a 
variety of concerns. This Section focuses on both the problems with the 
Court’s holding and reasoning as well as its broader implications. First, this 
Section addresses and critiques the majority and concurring opinions. Next, it 
outlines the practical implications that result. Finally, it highlights theoretical 
and moral concerns that arise from this decision. 
A.  The Court’s Incorrect Application of Legal Standards and Policies 
The majority opinion answered two questions and addressed an 
additional policy issue.  The first question was whether inmates making as-
applied challenges to execution methods should be held to the same standard 
as those making facial challenges.156  The second question was whether 
Bucklew raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Missouri’s 
lethal injection protocol would cause a substantial risk of severe harm, and if 
so, whether there was an available known alternative method of execution.157  
The majority implied the importance of timeliness in carrying out executions 
and used that as an underlying policy argument throughout the opinion.158 
The majority maintained that Glossip is directly controlling in this case 
because Glossip stated in clear terms that an available alternative method is 
“require[d] of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims” 
challenging unconstitutional pain.159  This reasoning is flawed, however, 
because the circumstances in Glossip were different than those present here.  
The inmates in Glossip were challenging the entire execution method 
employed by the state of Oklahoma, whereas Bucklew argued that it would 
be unconstitutional when applied to him alone.160  The distinction is important 
when considering the policy behind Glossip and how that policy does not 
apply in this case.161  The Court in Glossip was concerned with inmates using 
Section 1983 execution method challenges as a backdoor means of abolishing 
capital punishment altogether.162  While a valid concern under the 
circumstances of Glossip, that concern was not relevant to Bucklew’s case.  
Bucklew individually getting a different execution method would not 
invalidate Missouri’s execution method nor would it prevent other death row 
inmates from being executed under Missouri’s current protocol.163 
 
 156. Id. at 1122.  
 157. Id. at 1129.  
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 1124 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015)). 
 160. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1118. 
 161. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 162. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33. 
 163. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Like Baze, the Court in Glossip was also concerned with giving 
deference to state legislatures and their chosen execution methods.164  Again, 
while a valid consideration in those cases, that concern is not applicable here 
because the Missouri legislature could not predict which methods might be 
unconstitutionally painful for individuals with rare medical conditions.165  
Even when accepting Glossip as controlling, there are attributes of the Glossip 
opinion that raise concern with the Court’s precedent.166  In the 136 years of 
execution method challenges between Wilkerson v. Utah and Glossip, no 
decision imposed a requirement that an inmate plead an alternative method of 
execution until Glossip.167  On the contrary, Hill v. McDonough expressly 
rejected the notion.168  The majority in Glossip asserted that Hill was not 
controlling and dismissed it as a procedural case rather than a substantive one 
–  but the issue at hand in Bucklew’s case was both procedural and 
substantive.169  The majority also erred when it contrasted lethal injection with 
the barbarous and torturous execution methods employed in the past, which it 
alleged the Eighth Amendment is meant to prohibit.170  Although lethal 
injection may generally not be considered torturous, Bucklew argued that, 
when applied to him, there was a substantial risk that it would be excruciating 
and have the effects of torture.171  The majority essentially responded that the 
State could execute him with lethal injection anyway.172 
Even accepting the majority’s holding that Baze and Glossip apply, 
Bucklew clearly raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was an 
available alternative method.  Because the posture below was a grant of 
summary judgment to the State, the applicable standard for the State to prevail 
on appeal is whether “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”173  
The record, including “depositions, documents, [and] affidavits or 
declarations” must be viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.174  Bucklew presented a plethora of evidence via expert 
 
 164. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008). 
 165. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1141 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  Wilkerson v. Utah is the oldest method-of-execution case that went to the 
Supreme Court. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). 
 168. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) (“[t]he United States as amicus 
curiae contends that a capital litigant’s § 1983 action can proceed if, as in Nelson, . . . 
the prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. . . . [E]ven if 
the United States’ proposed limitation were likely to be effective we could not accept 
it.”). 
 169. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738–39. 
 170. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1122–24.  The Eighth Amendment is interpreted under 
an “evolving standards of decency” test, changing the definition of “cruel and 
unusual” over time to reflect societal norms and expectations.  Merrill, supra note 92, 
at 177. 
 171. Brief for Petitioner at 10–13, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
 172. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1133. 
 173. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 174. Id.; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014). 
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testimony showing a high likelihood he would experience suffocation and 
excruciating pain for up to several minutes.175  The district court refused to 
grant summary judgment to the State on the issue, holding that the dispute 
between Bucklew’s expert and the State’s expert created a factual issue not 
resolvable on summary judgment.176  Bucklew’s expert also “strongly 
disagree[d] with [the State expert’s] repeated claim that the pentobarbital 
injection would result in ‘rapid unconsciousness.’”177   
The majority essentially ignored all of Bucklew’s expert testimony and 
concluded that there was no evidence he would experience pain for more than 
twenty to thirty seconds after the injection.178  Whether the expert would 
ultimately be correct was a question of fact and therefore not appropriate to 
consider at the summary judgment stage.  Bucklew also showed a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether there was an available alternative method.  He 
identified nitrogen hypoxia – a method permitted by Missouri law179 – as an 
alternative.180  Bucklew introduced studies from states that specifically 
authorize nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method showing that it is quick, 
less likely to be painful, and easy to implement.181  The majority again ignored 
evidence introduced by Bucklew and concluded that “nothing on the record” 
showed lethal injection would take longer than nitrogen hypoxia to effectuate 
and Bucklew’s evidence did not show that it would be easy to implement.182  
Had the Court correctly adhered to the summary judgment standard, Bucklew 
would have had an opportunity to move forward with his case. 
The majority also mistakenly focused on the timeliness of Bucklew’s 
execution as a policy argument.  Bucklew was sentenced to death more than 
twenty years ago.183  However, Bucklew’s case is not an anomaly; the average 
time between sentencing and execution has risen from just over six years in 
1984 to more than twenty years in 2017.184  There are important reasons to be 
concerned with the increasing length of time between sentencing and 
execution.  It “frustrates the interests of the State and of surviving victims, 
who have ‘an important interest’ in seeing justice done quickly.”185  Lengthy 
 
 175. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1138 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1133.  “[A]ny conscious sensation of suffocation, asphyxiation, 
burning, or other extreme pain that remained present for as little as a few seconds” 
constitutes unnecessary pain. Brenton Schick, Lethal Injection, Cruel and Unusual? 
Establishing A Demonstrated Risk of Severe Pain: Morales v. Cate, 623 F.3d 828 (9th 
Cir. 2010), 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 182 (2011). 
 179. MO. REV. STAT. § 546.720 (2018). 
 180. Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1132, 1129. 
 183. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 184. Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-row 
[perma.cc/P87M-7XL6]. 
 185. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). 
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stays are costly to the State and may also intensify the suffering accompanying 
the execution itself by increasing time in solitary confinement.186  Delays also 
undermine the deterrent and retributive effects of capital punishment.187  
These concerns, however, must not outweigh the constitutional protections 
that are guaranteed to death row inmates.188  In 2018, a Gallup poll showed 
that less than half of Americans think the death penalty is applied fairly.189  
With that little trust in the fairness of capital punishment procedures, the law 
must “ensur[e] that we accurately identify, through procedurally fair methods, 
those who may lawfully be put to death.”190  We simply cannot have it both 
ways; either we care about constitutional safeguards or we care about speedy 
outcomes.  When dealing with something as irreversible as taking lives, we 
must prioritize constitutional protections over timeliness.  
B.  Practical Implications 
The majority faulted Bucklew for not outlining his proposed alternative 
method with painstaking detail and particularity.191  For example, the Court 
criticized him for failing to specify the required concentration of nitrogen 
hypoxia, the vessel needed to administer the drug, and how to protect the 
execution team from possible gas leaks.192  There are two problems with this 
reasoning.  First, Glossip did not impose any requirement that an inmate 
pleading an alternative method must give guidance down to the last detail.193  
The majority devised these requirements sua sponte and did not give Bucklew 
any notice that he would be required to plead such details.  Second, these 
requirements effectively make it impossible for any inmate’s as-applied 
execution method challenge to prevail.194  This creates a serious line-drawing 
issue because the Court could find fault with claims from future petitioners 
for not including any new required detail the Court decides is relevant and 
necessary. 
This also presents an issue of burden shifting.  Requiring a death row 
inmate to propose an alternative method of his own execution when the State 
has better resources to make such determinations is facially unfair.  However, 
accepting that an inmate must plead an alternative method because a state 
cannot predict the particularized needs of individuals, the feasible and readily 
implemented standard should be relaxed.  When weighing the effects on both 
parties, the State is better equipped to prove the dignity of an execution 
 
 186. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2764–67 (2015). 
 187. Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 188. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189. Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-
penalty.aspx. 
 190. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 1129.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 1143 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id.  
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method than an inmate is to prove a potentially a gruesome death at the hands 
of the government. 
Not only is it absurd to expect so much from an inmate, it is also unfair 
because most inmates challenging their execution method lack the resources 
to adequately prove the alternative.  Inmates in this position have no way of 
knowing this information and obtaining it is surely difficult.  Even if they 
could research and provide some detail, the inmate likely is not a medical 
doctor or a safety expert.  Further, defendants probably do not have the money 
to hire experts to prepare all of this information.  Most importantly, is it not 
cruel and unusual in itself to force an inmate to research, choose, and present 
their preferred method of death? 
C.  Theoretical Concerns 
Justice Breyer perfectly encapsulated the biggest problem with the 
majority opinion when he wrote:  
[T]his case adds to the mounting evidence that we can either have a 
death penalty that avoids excessive delays and “arguably serves 
legitimate penological purposes,” or we can have a death penalty that 
“seeks reliability and fairness in the death penalty’s application” and 
avoids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. . . . It may well 
be that we “cannot have both.”195   
The reasoning given by the majority can be rationalized within the 
confines of modern death penalty jurisprudence.  However, the fact that there 
is even a debate about something as repugnant as whether an individual must 
prove a less gruesome way for himself to die should give pause to any 
reasonable person. 
Capital punishment has evolved to become something clinical and 
unseen.  For most of this country’s history, the death penalty was a gruesome 
public spectacle and typically involved public hangings that drew large 
crowds.196  Now, state-sanctioned executions are done in small, clinical rooms 
with the assistance of medical personnel, and are not seen by many people.197  
In fact, the very reason we have lethal injection is because of the growing 
discomfort that resulted from both needless suffering from less 
 
 195. Id. at 1145 (quoting Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting)). 
 196. Sech, supra note 69, at 391. 
 197. Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to Be Retributive: Execution 
Methods, Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2003).  When executions moved away from the public view 
to take place in prisons, many states enacted statutes dictating who could attend, but a 
jurisdictional split has emerged regarding whether there is a First Amendment right to 
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technologically advanced execution methods, such as hanging and 
electrocution, and from the prospect of executing an innocent person.198  The 
difference between executions in the past and executions now is that we are 
able to argue about them in the abstract; most people are not affected by 
capital punishment, do not watch it take place, and often do not even know it 
is happening.  Execution methods are easy to discuss when we are not forced 
to experience them.  Overlooking whether a method is actually cruel is easy 
when we do not have to observe the execution.   
Capital punishment is withering away in part due to squeamishness felt 
toward it by Americans.199  This raises the question, why allow capital 
punishment at all if we are not comfortable with the reality of executions?  
Most democratic countries have abolished the death penalty and moved 
forward, leaving us in the company of authoritarian regimes.200  Many of the 
countries that have yet to abolish capital punishment still allow public 
hangings, which at least speaks to one of the penological purposes of the death 
penalty – deterrence.201  In the United States, with executions done in secrecy, 
it is hard to see which – if any – penological purposes are still served. 
Another problem with the death penalty is that cruel and unusual 
punishment is a subjective standard.202  A major attribute of the Eighth 
Amendment is that it is not interpreted as a static concept but rather as a 
standard that evolves and changes over time to match what society accepts as 
decent.203  This concept has allowed the Supreme Court to maintain a vague 
standard and alter it as needed to fit within the zeitgeist as it changes.204  Under 
this method of interpretation, the Court has been able to build upon standards 
of decency to become more restrictive over time.205  Because of its inherent 
subjectivism, relying on the Eighth Amendment as a constitutional protection 
for inmates challenging their methods of execution is lackluster. 
More concerning, however, is the Court’s seeming departure from the 
evolving standards of decency analysis and its revival of applying 
constitutional originalism206 to Eighth Amendment execution method 
challenges.  The Court has applied the evolving standards of decency test 
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since 1958, when it determined that “the words of the Amendment are not 
price, and . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”207  The majority in Bucklew seemed to make an originalist argument 
for capital punishment when it noted that “death was ‘the standard penalty for 
all serious crimes’ at the time of the founding”208 and that “methods of 
execution like these [dragging the prisoner to the place of execution, 
disemboweling, quartering, public dissection, and burning alive] readily 
qualified as ‘cruel and unusual,’ as a reader at the time of the Eighth 
Amendment’s adoption would have understood those words.”209  While the 
evolving standards of decency test is subjective in nature, it is a better 
alternative than determining whether a punishment was cruel and unusual 
more than 200 years ago.  Technology has improved since the inception of the 
Eighth Amendment, allowing for more humane options.  Further, popular 
beliefs about capital punishment have evolved and people are no longer 
comfortable with gruesome methods of execution. 
Execution by a firing squad or by guillotine would likely pass the Baze-
Glossip test as alternatives that would substantially reduce the risk of severe 
pain.  Courts and legislatures, however, likely would not consider allowing 
something like the guillotine as an execution method because its use is 
reminiscent of a darker time in human history.210  Despite its efficiency, the 
idea of using a guillotine to conduct executions would probably horrify most 
people.211  “The massive, razor-sharp blade coming down, the sound of the 
impact, and the bloody end create a nightmarish mental picture. Contrast this 
with the sterile, cool room, the needle, and the seemingly serene outcome that 
is the expected outcome of lethal injection.”212  The comparison between the 
methods of execution suggests that what is cruel and unusual is in the eye of 
the beholder.213  If the death penalty is constitutional, then we should at least 
recognize it for what it is and embrace quicker, less painful methods of 
execution that are much less likely to be botched and also happen to be more 
gruesome.  If we refuse to allow such shocking execution methods because 
we cannot face the grisly reality that is capital punishment, then maybe we 
have no business imposing it at all. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since capital punishment was reinstituted in 1976, courts have made it 
more and more difficult for inmates to successfully challenge their execution 
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method, which is almost always lethal injection.  The outcome in this case did 
nothing to relieve this burden, and in fact, made it more difficult by holding 
that the Baze-Glossip test – requiring a showing that a challenged execution 
method is substantially likely to result in severe pain and that a known and 
readily implemented alternative is available – applies to all execution method 
claims, including as-applied challenges.  Applying this test, the Court held 
that Bucklew did not sufficiently show that he would face a substantial risk of 
severe pain under Missouri’s execution method or that his proposed 
alternative – nitrogen hypoxia – would be readily implemented or reduce his 
risk of pain. 
Bucklew v. Precythe presents a variety of practical implications and 
theoretical concerns.  The standard has now been raised so high that it will be 
nearly insurmountable for future petitioners to successfully challenge their 
execution methods, whether facially or as applied.  In faulting Bucklew for 
not pleading his alternative method with painstaking attention to detail, the 
Court created a line-drawing problem that will allow courts to move the 
goalpost if they are at all in disagreement with a petitioner’s proposed 
alternative method.  This case finally raises concerns about the purpose of 
capital punishment itself.  When stepping back to see the big picture of the 
issue, the mere fact that there is a debate over whether a person must show an 
easier way for him to die at the hands of the government is alarming and raises 
the question of why we still have capital punishment.  The decision also leads 
one to ask whether capital punishment serves any legitimate penological 
purposes anymore.  Russell Bucklew should have had the opportunity to 
litigate his case at trial where a finder of fact could have determined whether 
he successfully showed that Missouri’s execution method, as applied to him, 
created a substantial risk of severe pain and whether his proposed alternative 
would be readily implemented.  Instead, he was executed by the state of 
Missouri on October 1, 2019.214 
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